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Abstract
This article develops a formal theory of the structural aspects
of organizational change. It concentrates on changes in an
organization’s architecture, depicted as a code system. It
models the common process whereby an initial architectural
change prompts other changes in the organization, generating a
cascade of changes that represents the full reorganization. The
main argument ties centrality of the organizational unit initi-
ating a change to the total time that the organization spends
reorganizing and to the associated opportunity costs. The cen-
tral theorem holds that the expected deleterious effect of a
change in architecture on the mortality hazard increases with
viscosity and the intricacy of the organizational design.
(Organizational Change; Cascades; Organizational Mortality)
Introduction
The theory of structural inertia (Hannan and Freeman
1977, 1984) has motivated a considerable body of empir-
ical research on the effects of change in core orga-
nizational features on the hazard of mortality.1 This
research generally supports the basic insights of the the-
ory. However, the theory has not developed in parallel
with empirical research on these issues. We think that
further progress in understanding organizational inertia
and change requires sustained attention to theoretical
foundations.
This article has two broad objectives. First, we pro-
pose a formal language that is suitable for expressing
the insights of the original theory and also supporting
efforts to deepen and broaden it. Second, we use this
language to embed the original arguments in a richer
model of organizational structure and to show that some
key assumptions of the original theory can be derived as
theorems in the new one. This effort involves elaborat-
ing what might be called microfoundations for organi-
zational ecology.2
At least four types of processes delay—and often
prevent—organizational change: (1) structural processes,
including the consequences of intricacy and viscosity
(sluggishness of response); (2) institutional processes,
involving identities and the “moral” character of struc-
tural arrangements; (3) political processes, involving
interests and interest-group politics; and (4) learning
processes, involving feedback over time. While any spe-
ciﬁc major organizational change likely activates several,
or even all, of these processes, we think it clariﬁes the
analytical picture to deal with them separately. This arti-
cle addresses only some of the basic structural processes;
it makes no claim to comprehensiveness.
The original theory of structural inertia pertains to
changes in the “core” features of organizations, not
peripheral ones. In developing this theory, Hannan and
Freeman (1984) provided some speciﬁcs—They claimed
that four features constitute a generalized core: (1) the
organizational mission, (2) the form of authority and the
nature of the exchange between the organization and its
members, (3) the basic technology used to transform
inputs into outputs, and (4) the organization’s general
marketing strategy. Limiting the scope of the theory in
this way—the restriction to a set of purported canonical
features—now seems unfounded. Moreover, this limita-
tion on scope does not constrain empirical research: A
review of studies testing the main implications of the
theory shows that researchers claim a very wide variety
of organizational features as among the canonical core
features (Barnett and Carroll 1995, Carroll and Hannan
2000).
We advance here a structural alternative to specify-
ing coreness. We examine changes in an organization’s
architecture (deﬁned as a code system) and analyze their
impacts in terms of the cascades of subsequent changes
throughout the organization. We follow the original the-
ory in positing that such architectural changes initiate
periods of reorganization. We deﬁne such reorganization
periods precisely in two ways: (1) the total time spent
reorganizing in all parts of the organization even if some
occur simultaneously and (2) the temporal span required
to bring all the organization’s feature values in line with
the new architecture. We assume that the total time spent
reorganizing increases with the intricacy of an organiza-
tion’s design, where intricacy is deﬁned as a strong and
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complex pattern of interconnections among the organi-
zation’s component units and with viscosity, the typical
time it takes for a unit to respond to changes and bring
local architecture into conformity.
The second part of the argument ties these consid-
erations to organizational mortality using the standard
assumption that an organization’s hazard of mortality
is proportional to its stock of resources. We assume
that reorganization diminishes an organization’s abil-
ity to take advantage of opportunities. It then follows
that organizations undergoing reorganization miss more
opportunities relative to those that are not reorganizing,
thereby lowering resources and increasing the hazard
of mortality. The key theorems hold that the expected
effect of organizational change on the mortality hazard
increases with the intricacy of design and viscosity.
Formalizing Organizational Ecology
Organizational ecology and demography have spawned a
variety of thriving theory fragments and bodies of related
empirical research. These include theories of:
• structural inertia and change (Hannan and Freeman
1984, Haveman 1992, Barnett and Carroll 1995, Hannan
et al. 2003),
• age dependence (Barron et al. 1994, Sørensen and
Stuart 2000),
• niche width (Hannan and Freeman 1977, Dobrev
et al. 2001),
• resource partitioning (Carroll 1985, Carroll and
Swaminathan 2000, Park and Podolny 2000),
• density dependence (Hannan 1989, Carroll and
Hannan 1989, Hannan and Carroll 1992, Barron 1999,
Ruef 2002),
• localized competition (Hannan and Freeman 1977,
McPherson 1983, Baum and Singh 1994, Podolny et al.
1996),
• organizational identities and forms (Zuckerman
1999, Ruef 2000, McKendrick and Carroll 2001, Baron
2002),
• social movement forms (Minkoff 1999, Ingram and
Simons 2000, Olzak and Uhrig 2001, Swaminathan and
Wade 2001, Sandell 2001),
• red-queen evolution (Barnett and Hansen 1996, Bar-
nett and Sorenson 2002), and
• recruitment-based competition (Sørensen 2000).
These strands can sensibly be regarded as fragments
in a larger research program because they (1) build on
a common conception of the organizational world as
shaped by processes of selection and (2) share method-
ological presumptions and practices (Carroll and Hannan
2000). A considerable amount of formalizing activity
has already taken place in this arena. Various fragments
have been subject to rational reconstruction and logical
analysis designed to test the soundness of the arguments.
Fragments analyzed in this manner include: structural
inertia and change (Péli et al. 1994, 2000), niche width
(Péli 1997), and age dependence (Hannan 1998; Pólos
and Hannan 2002, 2003). These efforts took seriously
the “frozen” published texts; that is, they translated the
natural-language renderings of the arguments into a for-
mal language and checked the proofs of the claims in
that language. Although this work has been valuable in
establishing the soundness of the main arguments and
in ﬁlling gaps in arguments, it has taken a largely pas-
sive role with respect to moving the theories forward.
In particular, because these efforts consider each frag-
ment in isolation from the others, they did not clarify
the relationships among the fragments.
The relationships among organizational ecology’s the-
ory fragments do require clariﬁcation. The preponder-
ance of effort over the last 25 years has focused on
empirical testing, with relatively little attention paid
to issues of theoretical integration. A lack of progress
on integration makes it hard to envision exactly which
empirical projects would move the larger program
forward substantially.
In a pair of previous articles, we began a series of
projects aimed at integrating the theory fragments by
developing a formal language that allows a precise def-
inition of the key units of organizational ecology: form
and population (Pólos et al. 2002) and the niche (Hannan
et al. 2003). This article continues the effort by turning
to the Hannan-Freeman (1984) theory of structural iner-
tia. We attempt to embed the theory in a richer model
of organizational structure such that some of what the
original theory assumed can be derived. Moreover, we
want to construct this model broadly so that it can also
serve as a foundation for other related fragments. We
use logic as the modeling tool because it allows us to
keep the structure of the argument close to the original
formulations and the key intuitions while also establish-
ing the soundness of the arguments. We use a particular
nonmonotonic logic that regards the causal claims of the
arguments to be rules with exceptions. The Appendix
sketches the logic; full details can be found in Pólos and
Hannan (2003).
We build models on two levels. We specify processes
holding for units in an organization and we derive impli-
cations at the organization level. We concentrate on the
possibility that actions in one unit can set off cascades
of actions in other units. We argue that long cascades
complicate organizational action and heighten the risk
of failure. Our formal representation of these arguments
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Table 1 Notation: Logical Constants, Predicates, Functions,
and Relations
Logical Constants
∨ disjunction
∧ conjunction
¬ negation
∃ classical existential quantiﬁer
∀ classical universal quantiﬁer
→ classical material implication
 nonmonotonic “normally” quantiﬁer
 nonmonotonic “ad-hoc” quantiﬁer
 nonmonotonic “presumably” quantiﬁer
Predicates
Oop x is an organization in population p
reu t t′ u is in reorganization during 	t t′
REo t t′ none of o’s units is in reorganization during 	t t′
uuo u is a unit in organization o
Functions
cu centrality of unit u
Io intricacy of organization o
Relations
 dominance relation over units
thus works on two levels. Our notation is complicated
by the fact that we specify parallel functions and random
variables at the unit and organizational level. To keep
this distinction straight, we use the convention that pred-
icates functions, or random variables that are deﬁned
for an organizational unit, are expressed in lower-case
strings and that those deﬁned for entire organizations
are in upper-case strings. Tables 1 and 2 summarize our
notation.
It is important to recognize that the arguments per-
tain to the domain of organizations. Although we intend
that our arguments apply generally to organizational
worlds, not all kinds of organizations can be compared
meaningfully in a straightforward fashion. The ﬁelds
of organizational demography and ecology make clear
that comparisons make the most sense when attention is
paid to populations of organizations (Carroll and Hannan
2000). We intend that the theory be understood as apply-
ing to all populations of organizations, and we are not
aware of any exceptions. If we did know of such excep-
tional cases, we would express the entire theory as hold-
ing as a rule with exceptions, and we would employ
nonmonotonic quantiﬁcation over populations.3
Organizational Architecture
Organizational analysts commonly distinguish between
architectural (formal) and cultural (informal) features.
Table 2 Notation (cont’d.): Random Variables, Probabilities,
and Key Parameters
Random Variables
du t duration of an induced violation in unit u
Do t  u t= 1 sum of the durations of the induced
violations in a cascade initiated by
unit u at time t
Do t sum of the durations of the induced
violations in a cascade initiated by a
random unit at time t
u t= 1 unit u initiates an architectural code
change just before t (=0 otherwise)
o t= 1 organization o experiences an
architectural code just before t
(= 0 otherwise)
mu t t′ number of opportunities missed by
unit u during 	t t′
Mu t t′ number of opportunities missed by
org. o during 	t t′
o t organization o’s hazard of mortality at t
No t  u t= 1 number of units with induced violations
in o in a cascade initiated by unit u at t
No t number of units with induced violations
in o in a cascade initiated by a
randomly chosen unit at t
Ro t organization o’s stock of resources at t
vuu′ t= 1 unit u′ induces an architectural code
violation in u at t (=0 otherwise)
Organization-Speciﬁc Parameters
o hazard of initiating arch. change
for units in o
o hazard of initiating arch. change for
organization o
o probability of induced
arch. code violation for units in o
o characteristic duration of an induced
violation in o (viscosity)
Population-Speciﬁc Parameters
 probability that a unit misses an
opportunity while in not in
reorganization
˜ probability that a unit misses an
opportunity while in reorganization
 arrival rate of opportunities for
organization o
Consistent with Weber’s (1968) early observations on
bureaucratic structure, architecture refers to the formal
(“ofﬁcial”) speciﬁcations of an organization and its gov-
ernance. Architectural choices are reﬂected in the formal
structures for assigning work, that is, construction of
the units that undertake the subtransactions. The choices
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also specify the means of coordinating members and
units, monitoring them, and allocating resources and
rewards. Culture governs the processes by which work
actually gets completed.
When viewed abstractly, speciﬁc architectural (and
cultural) elements can be regarded as the values of
functions that specify organizational features. As Simon
(1951) explained in analyzing the employment relation,
such feature values are not deﬁned with absolute sharp-
ness; rather they allow a certain amount of tolerance.4
We posit that architectures discriminate between the
allowed and disallowed feature values. That is, they
impose constraints on feature values, limiting the values
that they can legitimately take.
An appropriate language for expressing architectures
ought to be capable of reﬂecting these considerations.
Moreover, it should allow precise judgments about the
consistency of the various features that comprise an
architecture. We opt for a linguistic formulation. Archi-
tectures can be represented as collections of sentences
pertaining to ontology (e.g., deﬁnitions of the units in an
architecture) and rules (e.g., statements of which units
have authority over which other units). We regard such
sentences as codes. As explained in Pólos et al. (2002),
the notion of code can be understood as both (1) a set
of speciﬁcations in a blueprint, as in the genetic code,
and (2) a set of rules of conduct, as in the penal code.
Our use of the term code reﬂects both meanings.
The task of modeling the consequences of violations
of architecture is complicated by the fact that the codes
differ in importance. Some codes matter greatly in the
sense that violations are punished very severely, while
others are handled with a lighter touch; consider the
distinction between felonies and misdemeanors. Model-
ing the processes that control the status of codes in this
dimension poses numerous challenges, and we do not
attempt it here. Instead, we restrict the theory to apply
to serious codes. Henceforth, when we refer to architec-
tural codes, we always mean only the serious ones, those
for which observable violations bring strong sanctions.
We model an architecture as a set of values on the
relevant organizational features (e.g., form of authority,
pattern of control relations, accounting principles, com-
pensation policies). Some relevant features are common
to units in an organization (e.g., those that pertain to
its global architecture); others vary by type of unit. We
describe the architecture of a unit by identifying the
relevant features and determining the set of alternative
values of each feature. For instance, form of authority
might be a relevant feature; and the alternative values
might be bureaucratic, professional, and charismatic. In
other words, we consider features to be functions that
map from organizations and time points to the range of
possible values. We denote the kth feature of unit u at
time t as fku t, and we denote the range of possible
values by the set kut . The space of potential architec-
tures for the unit is the Cartesian product of the sets of
possible values taken over all of the relevant features:
ut ≡ 1 u t ×2 u t × · · · ×Ku t . Finally, we let aut
denote the unit’s actual architecture, the set of choices
of values for each of the relevant features.
It will also prove helpful to have a formal represen-
tation of the architectural codes. These codes restrict
the set of allowable architectures. A sharp architec-
tural code rules out many of the possibilities in ut; a
loose architecture places few constraints on the archi-
tectural choices of the unit. It will be important to dis-
tinguish architectural codes controlled by the unit from
those imposed externally. Let 	ut ⊆ ut denote the set
that contains the allowable architectures for unit u at
time t, and 	iut and 	
e
ut be the internally and externally
controlled subcodes, respectively: 	ut = 	iut ∪ 	eut (for
simplicity, we assume that the two subcodes are dis-
joint). The imposed codes reﬂect a superordination rela-
tion among units; they could arise from speciﬁed lines
of authority, from the ﬂow of work or from any simi-
lar relation that allows one part of the organization to
impose constraints on another part. An important class
of interunit relations concerns subordination in choice of
architecture.
Notation. We use the two-place predicate Oop to
tell that “o is an organization in population p.” The pred-
icate uu o tells that “u is a unit of the entity o, where
Oop.” We add the background assumption that units
belong to only one organization.5 Let the relation u u′
indicate that “u and u′ are units in the same organiza-
tion and u is superordinate to unit u′ in the sense that
choices of architectural feature values by u create archi-
tectural code restrictions (binding constraints) for u′.”
And, let the random variable u t equal one if unit u
changes its architecture just after t and equal zero other-
wise. When we want to refer to an organization—rather
than a unit—undergoing architectural change, we use the
random variable o t, which equals one if any unit in
organization o experiences architectural change at (just
after) time t and equals zero otherwise.
Induced Code Violations and Cascades
The situations that we analyze begin with a change in
architectural codes by a particular organizational unit.
The initiating unit might sit anywhere in the orga-
nization’s formal hierarchy. The reasons for this ini-
tial change are not pertinent to our theory; they could
466 Organization Science/Vol. 14, No. 5, September–October 2003
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encompass a wide variety of possibilities including
changes in external opportunities and constraints, exec-
utive tinkering, and internal strife. The speciﬁc change
undertaken might be sensible in that it would likely
improve organizational alignment and functioning, but
we do not assume that this is so—changes surely can
also degrade performance. We focus on cases in which
the initiating change is architectural because the archi-
tecture is more malleable to management and to indi-
vidual decision makers: Changing the architecture often
requires only a directive from someone with authority.
Inconsistencies between new and existing codes nor-
mally become salient and consequential when actions
that would have satisﬁed the old code do not satisfy
the new code. We represent this situation formally by
deﬁning violations of a unit’s architectural code that
are induced by another unit with the random variable
vuu′ t.
Deﬁnition 1. A unit experiences induced violation
of new architectural code if and only if an induced
change in its architectural code results in its feature
values violating an architectural code when no vio-
lation existed prior to the change. In formal terms,
vuu′ t= 1 if and only if
(1) Oop∧uu o and u is subordinate to u′;
(2) unit u′ initiates an architectural change at time t;
(3) just before the change, unit u’s architecture con-
forms to all of applicable architectural code;
(4) after the change, u’s unchanged architecture does
not conform to the newly imposed architectural code.
And, vuu′ t= 0 otherwise.
Organizational changes often generate cascades of
related changes in the sense that a single initial change
often begets a series of subsequent changes as well.
For instance, consider Alfred P. Sloan’s (1963, p. 50)
description of the architectural change at General Motors
in 1920 that implemented its fabled decentralized orga-
nizational structure:
The principles of organization    thus initiated for the modern
General Motors the trend toward a happy medium in industrial
organization between the extremes of pure centralization and
pure decentralization. The new policy asked that the corpora-
tion neither remain as it was, a weak form of organization,
nor become a rigid, command form. But the actual forms of
organization that were to evolve in the future   what exactly,
for example, would remain a divisional responsibility and what
would be coordinated, and what would be policy and what
would be administration—could not be deduced by a process
of logic from the “Organization Study” [the plan].
Sloan goes on to describe in detail how subsequent spe-
ciﬁc changes in the likes of product policy, coordina-
tion mechanisms, and ﬁnancial policy were needed to
make them consistent with the new basic architectural
structure.
Why do such cascades occur? If the code violations
arising from an architectural change can be reduced by
changing a subset of other codes, or by changing a fea-
ture value, then the initial architectural change can be
said to induce change in this second set of codes, or
in the feature value. Suppose that the process of seek-
ing to remove the code violations created by an archi-
tectural change boundedly follows rational search. The
agents, having changed one set of elements and expe-
rienced violations of the changed codes, search locally
to ﬁnd whether change in any other set of codes or
feature values might eliminate the code violations. The
search operates locally in the sense that it takes the ini-
tial change as given. It follows bounded rationality in
the sense that it stops whenever it ﬁnds a simple adjust-
ment that eliminates the code violation (even if other,
more distant changes might do this as well and also pro-
vide some other beneﬁts). Such a search-and-adjustment
process can yield a cascade of changes. Each time that
the process leads to the decision to implement a set of
conforming changes, these new changes play the role of
(second-order) changes. They initiate a new local bound-
edly rational search for ways to eliminate code violations
(conditional on the initial change and the second-order
changes) by changing yet other elements. At this step,
the search process might consider trying to undo the
original change. However, it often might be extremely
difﬁcult to restore the status quo ex ante, to “put the
Genie back in the bottle.” This is because the structure
of relationships prompting the chain of induced changes
may be hierarchical or uni-directional.
The presence of hidden codes provides another pos-
sible source of cascades. Architectural codes often take
a conditional form: The codes are formulae stating that,
if a certain set of conditions holds, then certain other
conditions should also hold. Suppose that the antecedent
in a conditional code does not obtain. Then the code is
satisﬁed vacuously, whatever the condition on the con-
sequent. Such codes or constraints can be regarded as
inactive. If a code has been inactive for a long time, then
it likely gets forgotten. In such a case, the code becomes
hidden. Now suppose that an architectural change acti-
vates the antecedent in a hidden code; then this action
might create a new (unforeseen) code violation.
How might cascades of architectural code changes be
represented formally? We begin with a code change in
a particular unit and trace out the chains of induced
changes in subordinate units. We analyze cascades at
three levels of detail. The most reﬁned level is an actual
cascade initiated by a particular architectural change. At
Organization Science/Vol. 14, No. 5, September–October 2003 467
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this level of detail, we trace the sequence of impelled
changes. At an intermediate level of detail, we analyze
the set of possible cascades that might be initiated by a
particular initial change. Here we characterize the aver-
age properties of the cascades in the set of possibilities.
At the least reﬁned level, we consider the average prop-
erties of the set of cascades that might result from an
initiating event in a random unit. We need this more
aggregated characterization to compare changes (and to
assess their expected impacts) across organizations with-
out having to specify the exact details of what codes or
features values get changed.
Detailed Structure of a Speciﬁc Cascade
At the most reﬁned level, we pay attention to the exact
sequence of code changes that comprise a cascade.
Deﬁnition 2. A particular cascade of resolutions of
induced architectural code violations in organization o
that begins at time t with a change initiated by unit u is
constructed as follows:
Step 0. The unit u, not in violation of any of its appli-
cable architectural code, initiates the cascade at time t
by changing architectural code, and that change induces
architectural code violations in one or more other units;
Step 1. A unit with an induced violation in Step 0
changes its architecture such that conformity elimi-
nates the induced violation, but this architectural change
induces a violation in one or more other units;
Step L. The only unit with an unresolved induced vio-
lation (generated by the previous steps in the cascade)
eliminates the violation at time tL, and this architectural
change does not induce a violation in any unit.
We denote such a cascade as Ku t, where the vari-
ables identify the unit that initiated the cascade (u) and
the time of initiation (t).
This particular cascade need not be the only cascade
that might be initiated by the change in Step 0. At
each step, the unit resolving an imposed architectural
violation might have a choice among several alterna-
tive resolutions. Which one it chooses then determines
which other units experience an imposed violation,
which shapes the direction of the cascade. Note also
that if at any step more than unit other unit is induced,
then the initial change has set off a cascade with multi-
ple branches, each of which might possibly be resolved
simultaneously.
A cascade can be characterized in terms of its number
of stages, the number of units that experience induced
violations during the cascade, and its temporal character
(including the time elapsed from origin to conclusion
and the total time units spent reorganizing even if in
parallel). A stage in a cascade is initiated each time that
a change by one unit induces violations in one or more
other units. A cascade with no indirect effects has only
one stage. A cascade in which the adjustments to the
ﬁrst stage induce violations that have no indirect effects
has two stages, and so forth. Thus we can measure the
number of stages in a cascade in terms of the number
of units whose changes induce violations in one or more
units.
This detailed account of the structure of a possible
cascade highlights the precise connections that animate
the cascade. Such a description might be useful for a
case study or for close study of a small number of cas-
cades. But it would likely prove too cumbersome as a
device for comparing change processes in different orga-
nizations (whose code systems likely differ). Therefore,
we now strip much of the detail from the story and focus
on the most comparable elements of cascades, and we
introduce probabilistic considerations explicitly.
Organizational Design and Cascades
The ﬁrst step in moving toward a characterization of
change that abstracts from the details of the actual code
substitutions involves recognizing that an organization’s
design might affect its possible cascades. The speciﬁc
design idea that we emphasize is that, generally speak-
ing, organizations with complicated patterns of intercon-
nections among their units will generate longer cascades.
This is because a change in any given unit is likely to
affect many other units when interconnectedness is com-
plex (Simon 1962).
To formalize this notion, we start by analyzing the
pattern of connections among units. These interconnec-
tions suggest a variety of possible cascades for any ini-
tial architectural change. To derive the cascade that will
likely be realized from this set, we make a stochastic
assumption about the level of coupling among units in
the organization. This framework then allows us to make
predictions about certain characteristics of a cascade,
including its expected total time spent reorganizing.
Unit Interconnections
Consider the following examples involving three archi-
tectures as depicted in Figure 1. Here the directed lines
indicate the constraints embedded in the architecture.
An arrow directed from ui to uj indicates that ui  uj .
On the left in the ﬁgure, Figure 1a, we see a ﬂat hier-
archy (“star” network): Unit u1 directly constrains u2
and u3, which are otherwise unconnected. In the middle,
Figure 1b, we have a vertical hierarchy. In this case,
u1 constrains u2 directly and u3 indirectly. Figure 1c
468 Organization Science/Vol. 14, No. 5, September–October 2003
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Figure 1 Illustration of Three Different Patterns of
Connections Among Units
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

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






	
depicts a case in which the classic attribute of hierar-
chy (unity of command—each unit has only one direct
superior) is violated. (This case, unlike the others, can-
not be described as a lattice.) In this case, u1 constrains
u2 and u3 directly and u2 constrains u3 directly. Thus u1
constrains u3 directly and indirectly.
Consider the likely effect of an architectural change in
the dominant unit (u1) in each case. In Case (a), u2 and
u3 can act independently in solving the problem, chang-
ing local architecture and resolving the violation. Thus
there is only one stage in the cascade, and the temporal
span of the cascade is simply the maximum of the dura-
tions of the unresolved code violations in the two units.
In the case of the three-level hierarchy, Case (b), there
are two stages in the cascade: one in which u2 adjusts
to the initial change and another in which u3 adjusts
to the induced change in u2. In this case the temporal
span is the sum of the durations of the unresolved code
violations in the two units.
Finally, the nonhierarchical case, Case (c), also has
two stages. As in Case (a), the temporal span is the
maximum of the two durations. However, the resolution
time for u3 will generally be longer in the nonhierar-
chical case. Consider two scenarios. First, u3 resolves
the inconsistency induced by the change in u1 before u2
does. At this point, the duration of the resolution for u3
is the same as it would have been in the structure in
Figure 1b, the vertical hierarchy. But, it still must adapt
to the not-yet-completed change in u2, so its total res-
olution time will be greater. In the second scenario, u2
completes its adjustment to the change by u1 before u3
does. This means that additional constraints on u3 get
imposed in the midst of its resolution process. We expect
that this will complicate the adjustment and lengthen the
period of resolution.
These simple cases suggest two lessons for building
a model of the process. First, we should attend to the
number of stages of a cascade: The total time spent reor-
ganizing and the temporal span of a cascade will gen-
erally increase with the number of stages it contains.
Second, we should pay attention to the complexity of the
pattern of connections among organizational units: The
time spent reorganizing within a cascade will generally
be longer the more that the pattern departs from simple
hierarchy (Simon 1962).
Unit Centrality and Organizational Coupling
The nuances recognized above can be captured by rep-
resenting the pattern of connections in an organization’s
architecture with an eigenvector measure of centrality.
Such measures have the general form that a unit’s cen-
trality in the architecture depends upon the centrality of
the units that it constrains. So a unit is central to the
extent that it constrains units that are themselves cen-
tral. Thus, the most central unit in the ﬂat hierarchy is
less central than the most central unit in the vertical
hierarchy.
Recall that two units are connected in an architectural
sense if the feature values of one govern and constrain
the architectural codes of the other. In particular, one
unit constrains another architecturally if the feature val-
ues (and choices allowed by the codes) of the former
are imposed as an external constraint (as codes) on the
latter. Let Uo be the number of units in the organization.
Consider a Uo×Uo adjacency matrix R for which rij = 1
if unit i constrains unit j architecturally and equals zero
otherwise, that is, if ui  uj .
An architectural change by one unit might or might
not induce a violation in a subordinate unit. It depends
on the details of the codes—both those codes that get
replaced and the relational codes among units. Given
this situation, it makes sense to construct a probabil-
ity model, using the probability that a change in one
unit induces an architectural code violation in another:
Prvuu′ t = 1. In general, this probability might
vary over pairs of units and over time. Differences
in typical induction probabilities among organizations
arguably correspond with variations in the tightness
of coupling. Loosely coupled organizations presumably
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tend to have lower induction probabilities than do tightly
coupled ones (Weick 1976, Manns and March 1978).
At some point in the development of this kind of
model, it might prove useful to analyze probability mod-
els that allow the induction probabilities to vary in spec-
iﬁed ways among dyads. However, at this point we only
want to characterize typical situations for sets of orga-
nizations. Therefore, we assume that induction proba-
bilities might vary between organizations but not over
dyads within organizations over time for an organiza-
tion. In other words, we assume that each organization
has a characteristic induction probability, which is con-
stant for all dyads and all time periods. This assumption
has the status of analytical convenience rather than of a
claim about the organizational world. As we explain in
the Appendix, we refer to the simplifying assumptions
that we expect to see relaxed in further developments of
the theory as “ad-hoc assumptions” (meaning that they
are temporary assumptions fashioned for the argument
at hand), and we refer to the real causal claims of the
theory as “postulates.” In this article, the ad-hoc assump-
tions concern the probabilistic structure of the change
process. We quantify ad-hoc assumptions using  (A in
a Gothic font), the “ad-hoc” quantiﬁer discussed in the
Appendix.
Ad-hoc Assumption 1. The probability that an
architectural change by a unit induces a violation in a
subordinate unit does not vary over pairs of units or time
points; it is an organization-speciﬁc constant, which we
denote by o.
o ∃o ∀uu′tOop∧uuo
∧u′u→Prvuu′t=1=o
∧u′u→Prvuu′t=1=0
(The formula in this assumption embodies the substan-
tive assumption that the probability normally does not
differ among dyads in an organization or over time
points for an organization, and it also establishes that we
label this probability as o for organization o.)
To build a representation of the structure of these ran-
dom cascades, we use a variation of Bonacich’s (1987)
measure of centrality.6 Let cu be an index of the cen-
trality of unit u.
Deﬁnition 3. The vector containing the centralities
of the units of organization o is given by:
c =
∑
k=1
koR
k
ol
where l is a N ×1 vector of ones.
It might prove helpful to apply this measure to the
three cases illustrated in Figure 1. The matrices that
record the  relations for these cases are
Ra =


011
000
000

  Rb =


010
001
000

 
Rc =


011
001
000

 
The squares of these matrices are
R2a =


000
000
000

  R2b =


001
000
000

 
R2c =


001
000
000

 
Because Rk is a matrix of zeros for k ≥ 2, we can cal-
culate the vector of centrality scores as follows:
ca =


2o
0
0

  cb =


o+2o
o
0

 
cc =


2o+2o
o
0

 
It is clear that the centrality scores vary with the archi-
tecture. It is also easy to see that the centrality scores
also depend upon the number of units. For instance,
adding a third subordinate unit to Case (a), but keeping
the architecture otherwise unchanged, would increase
the centrality of the dominant unit from 2o to 3o;
adding another vertical link at the bottom of the hierar-
chy in Case (b) causes the centrality score of the domi-
nant unit to increase from o+2o to o+2o +3o , and
so forth. In other words, the centrality scores reﬂect the
density and pattern of ties among units as well as the
number of units in the organization.
We propose that this characterization provides a useful
representation of a random cascade of induced architec-
tural changes. The cascade begins with an architectural
change by a unit at a time point. The random cascade
induced by this change can be regarded as a realization
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from the probability model in A.17 and the centrality
score of the initiating unit. Let No t  u t = 1 be
a random variable that records the number of induced
violations in the cascade Ku t.
Deﬁnition 4. The number of induced violations in
the cascade in organization o initiated by unit u at time t
is given by
No t  u t= 1≡ u′ t′ ∈Ku t
where  ·  denotes the cardinality of a set, the number of
distinct elements it contains.
Our reason for choosing this notion of centrality can
now be seen clearly. The centrality score of a unit in
architecture gives the expected number of induced vio-
lations in a cascade initiated by an architectural change
in that unit, according to the probability model. This is
the key to our model. Because this relationship plays an
important role in the analysis that follows, we make it
explicit.
Lemma 1. The expected number of induced violations
in a cascade initiated by an architectural change by a
unit equals its centrality in the architecture, cu.
ouu′ tOop∧uu o
→ EN o t  u t= 1= cu
where E· denotes the operation of mathematical
expectation.
Proof. In the nonmonotonic logic, establishing a
proof involves constructing the most-speciﬁc regularity
chains that connect the antecedent and the consequent.
The regularity chains are constructed from the available
deﬁnitions, postulates, strict rules, and ad-hoc assump-
tions. If the most speciﬁc of such a regularity chain sup-
ports the claim, then the theorem is proven. If among the
most-speciﬁc regularity chains, some support the claim
and others support the counter claim, then no conclusion
is warranted—the claim is not a theorem. Therefore, we
construct the most-speciﬁc regularity chains in sketching
each proof.
The expected number of induced violations, EN o t 
u t = 1, can be expressed as the sum of the
expected number of violations at each path length. That
is, EN o t  u t = 1 =∑k=1 EN ku t, where
EN ku t is the expected number of induced viola-
tions at step k of the cascade (that is, at path length k).
The joint probability of k inductions along a path, under
A.1, is given by ko . Because inductions must follow
the subordination relation, EN ku t=∑u=u′ kozkuu′ ,
where zkuu′ equals the number of distinct k-step paths
connecting u and u′. Inspection of the terms in the pow-
ers of R reveals that zkuu′ is the uu
′ entry in Rk. 
Temporal Aspects of a Cascade
The temporal dimension of a random cascade within
an organization matters decisively for possible conse-
quences, as we explain below. We considered two dif-
ferent ways to represent the temporal dimension of
cascades. The ﬁrst deﬁnes the temporal span of a cas-
cade as the time elapsed from the initiating event to the
elimination event that terminates the cascade, as noted
above. The second deﬁnes the total time reorganizing as
the sum of the times spent by the individual units in reor-
ganization mode (changing codes and feature values so
as to eliminate induced violations). The total time reor-
ganizing is calculated by summing the durations of all of
the reorganizations by units affected in a cascade, even if
they occur simultaneously, as with the types of changes
discussed by Romanelli and Tushman (1994). Both ideas
have substantive promise because a protracted period
of reorganization presumably complicates organizational
action and diverts the attention of at least some members
over the whole period—the ﬁrst idea—and because the
disruption caused by reorganization ought to be propor-
tional to the time spent by units (and their members) in
working out the consequences of changes—the second
idea. Given that we model processes at the unit level,
the argument goes more smoothly when we focus on the
second concept for the whole organization, total time
reorganizing. Nevertheless, we have to bring temporal
span back into the picture when we derive implications
of cascades of changes across organizations.
Now it might happen that different paths of induced
changes affect a unit such that one reorganization (effort
to eliminate an induced violation) gets interrupted by
another. We must make clear what we assume for
such situations. Start with the situation that does not
involve interruption. Let du t denote the random vari-
able that records the duration of an uninterrupted spell
of reorganization for unit u to eliminate a violation
induced at time t. Suppose, next, that a reorganization
does get interrupted in the sense that another violation
gets induced before the ﬁrst has been eliminated. What
should we expect about the duration of the reorganiza-
tion for this unit? We think that the normal case is one
in which the duration of the overlapping reorganizations
lasts (at least) as long as the sum of the two uninter-
rupted durations. Consider two scenarios. In one, the
problem of eliminating the second induction gets post-
poned until the ﬁrst reorganization ﬁnishes. In the other,
some attention gets shifted from the ﬁrst reorganization
to the second. In both cases, the amount of work to be
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done is arguably the same.8 We simplify and assume that
the expected time elapsed during the two overlapping
reorganizations equals the sum of expectations of the
durations of the two reorganizations in the uninterrupted
case.
Again we opt for simplicity in characterizing the prob-
ability model. We assume that an organization’s units
have a typical expected duration for induced violations,
that this expected duration varies among organizations,
but not within organizations (over episodes).
Ad-hoc Assumption 2. The expected unit-level
duration of an induced violation of an architectural
code does not vary over units or over time; it is an
organization-speciﬁc constant: "o.
o ∃ "o ∀uu′ tOop∧uu o∧ vuu′ t= 1
→ Edu t= "o
How should we think about "o? A large value of this
constant means that it typically takes a long time for a
unit to correct induced violations. To use a physical anal-
ogy, an organization in which things work slowly has
high viscosity—think of the difference between stirring
honey and water. Viscosity is often deﬁned (loosely) as
the resistance in a material to changes in form. Because
this analogy seems to ﬁt the organizational context, we
will refer to levels of viscosity in comparing organiza-
tions with different typical speeds of eliminating induced
violations.
The model of a random cascade in A.1–2, coupled
with the deﬁnition of centrality, yields a substantive
insight about the expected total time reorganizing. We
express this insight in terms of the random variable,
Do t  u t= 1, which gives the number of induced
violations in the cascade initiated by unit u at time t.
Deﬁnition 5. Do t  u t= 1 is the sum of the
durations of all reorganizations triggered by the cascade
Ku t.
Do t  u t= 1≡ ∑
u′ t′∈Ku t
du′ t′
(Note that total time reorganizing is not the same as the
temporal span of the cascade; we return to this difference
below.)
Theorem 1. The expected total time reorganizing by
an organization during a cascade that originates in
unit u is proportional to the centrality of unit u. (The
constant of proportionality is the organization-speciﬁc
viscosity.)
ou tOop∧uu o∧ u t= 1
→ EDo t  u t= 1= "ocu
Proof. The most-speciﬁc regularity chain uses A.1,
A.2, and L.1. 
Comparing Random Cascades:
Intricacy and Viscosity
In the foregoing, we considered cascades with speciﬁed
originating events. This allowed us to characterize the
consequences of the originating unit for the kind of cas-
cade that should be expected. We need to make another
abstraction so that we can characterize the entire orga-
nization in terms of its propensity to generate long cas-
cades. The needed abstraction treats the origin of the
cascade as random.
Based on the reasoning used in discussing the alter-
natives in Figure 1, we propose that the mean centrality
score in an organization provides a useful way to express
intuitions about likely cascade lengths. A unit has high
centrality only if it dominates units that themselves have
high centrality. Therefore, cascades are more likely to
hit units with high centralization in an organization with
a high mean centrality.
Indeed, mean centrality provides a way to characterize
the intricacy of the organization’s design.9 Let Io denote
a function that records the intricacy of the design of
organization o.
Deﬁnition 6. The intricacy of an organization’s
design is equivalent to the mean centrality over its
subunits:
Io ≡ 1/Uo
∑
u&uu o
cu
where Uo ≡ u  uu o, the number of units in the
organization.
Building a model at the organizational level requires
an explicit assumption about the distribution over orga-
nizational units of the probability of being the initiator,
conditional on a change being initiated. We express this
idea in terms of the rate of initiating change. Let 'u t
and (o t denote the rates at the unit and organiza-
tional level, respectively.
Deﬁnition 7. Let 'u t denote the hazard of initi-
ating an architectural change in unit u at t:10
'u t≡ lim
t′↓t
Pru t= 1/t′ − t
and let (o t denote the hazard for organization o:
(o t≡ lim
t′↓t
Pro t= 1/t′ − t= ∑
u&uu o
'u t
As with other aspects of the probability model, we
go for a high degree of simplicity. We assume homoge-
neity among units within an organization and over time.
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It might seem more natural to assume that the probabil-
ity of initiating architectural change rises with the level
in the organization’s hierarchy, that units closer to the
top are more likely to initiate changes. This assumption
is actually stronger than we need. The general line of
argument holds that cascades that start in units with high
centrality last longer and therefore create more serious
problems.11
Ad-hoc Assumption 3. The rate of initiating an
architectural change does not vary over units within
an organization or over time for an organization; it
is an organization-speciﬁc constant: 'o.
o ∃'o ∀uu′ t t′ Oop∧uu o∧uu′ o
→ 'u t= 'u′ t′= 'o
In developing proofs, we will encounter expressions
for the probability that a particular unit initiates a
change, given that some unit in the organization initiated
a change. Therefore, it is useful to record a straightfor-
ward consequence of A.3.
Lemma 2. The probability that any chosen unit is the
one that initiated a change (when one unit in the orga-
nization did initiate a change) equals 1/Uo, where Uo is
the number of units.
ou tOop∧uu o
→ Pru t= 1  o t= 1= 1/Uo
Proof. This result follows from standard calculations
in probability theory. It is easy to show that
Pru t= 1  o t= 1= 'u t/(o t
(Just sum both sides over all the units in the orga-
nization, and note the second equality in the second
line in D.7.) Given A.3 and D.7, the right-hand side of
the foregoing formula can be written as 'o/'oUo =
1/Uo. 
In the analysis that follows, we repeatedly calculate
expectations of functions of random cascades. These
functions involve summations over all of the induced
violations in a cascade. In the standard case, in which the
size of the set of elements in the summation is determin-
istic, the calculation uses the straightforward rule that the
expectation of a sum of functions of random variables is
the sum of the expectations. In the case of cascades, the
number of elements in the summation is itself a random
variable, No t  u t= 1, if the cascade initiates in
unit u. Recall also, that EN o t  u t= 1= cu,
according to L.1. Now consider the case in which the
initiating unit is chosen at random (as speciﬁed in the
ad-hoc assumptions). Let the random variables charac-
terizing a cascade with random origin be expressed as
the unconditional versions of the parallel terms for the
cascade with known origins. That is, let the number of
induced violations in a cascade with random origin be
denoted by No t, the total amount of reorganization
time in such a cascade as Do t, and the temporal span
by T o t.
Lemma 3. The expected number of induced violations
within a cascade with a random origin, No t, equals
the levels of intricacy, Io.
ou tOop∧uu o∧ o t= 1
→ EN o t= Io
Proof. According to the law of total probability12
(and given the premise that a change did occur at t),
EN o t = ∑
u&uuo
EN u t  u t= 1
·Pru t= 1
Given A.3 and L.3, the right-hand side of this equation
can be rewritten as:
1/Uo
∑
u&uu o
EN u t  u t= 1
According to L.2, this expression reduces to 1/Uo·

∑
u&uu o cu, which, by D.6, equals Io. 
With this result, it is straightforward to derive the
expected total time reorganizing in a cascade with ran-
dom initiation.
Theorem 2. The expected total time reorganizing for
a cascade with a random origin within an organization
is given by the product of the organization’s level of
intricacy, Io, and viscosity, "o.
o tOop∧ o t= 1→ EDo t= "oIo
Proof. The most-speciﬁc regularity chain uses A.2
and L.3. 
Missed Opportunities
We focus on periods of reorganization because devoting
attention, time, and energy to reorganization (adjusting
codes to eliminate incompatibilities) diverts members
of an organization from the tasks that generate rev-
enues. Therefore, any lengthy change process generally
entails substantial opportunity costs. Because manage-
ment attention gets focused on the change, opportunities
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are foregone, production gets disrupted, relations with
customers are left unattended as responsibilities are real-
located, and so forth. Each of these problems becomes
more serious as a reorganization lengthens. During a
reorganization period, considerable attention is paid to
the fate of the new architecture. The units whose archi-
tectural codes are altered generally face scrutiny such
that nonconformity of feature values to the newly added
code gets noted. In other words, unlike the situation
of normal functioning in which managerial attention to
architectural conformity is partial and episodic, viola-
tions of newly added code generally get noticed dur-
ing a reorganization period. The resulting diversion of
attention causes opportunities to be missed.
We specify the consequences of missed opportunities
in terms of the growth rate of resources. Let Ro t
denote the random variable that records the level of o’s
resources at time t. Organizations lose resources dur-
ing periods of reorganization, both because reorganiza-
tion is costly and also because directing resources and
attention away from “production” causes a drop in rev-
enue (the acquisition of new resources). For instance,
before the spin-off at Agilent Technologies, the CEO
of the parent company (Hewlett Packard) warned that
the units involved needed to “keep the plane ﬂying”
during the reorganization. His comment refers to a ten-
dency in early aviation for pilots and copilots to get
obsessed with ﬁxing the “problem” when cockpit lights
and buzzers went off and forget about actually ﬂying the
plane, thereby causing tragic accidents.
Tying structural change to missed opportunities
requires a speciﬁcation of the ﬂow of opportunities and
of the probability of missing an opportunity. We want to
continue to specify the basic process at the unit level,
but there is a slight complication. Two otherwise simi-
lar organizations might structure themselves into differ-
ent numbers of units. Simply creating more units ought
not, by itself, increase the ﬂow of opportunities. There-
fore it makes sense to specify that similar organizations
in a population experience the same ﬂow of opportu-
nities and that these opportunities are experienced by
units in way that reﬂects the degree of division of the
organization into units.
Deﬁnition 8. Let the arrival rate of opportunities to
unit u at time t be denoted by ,u t and the arrival
rate of opportunities to organization o at time t by
-o t; therefore, the expected ﬂow of opportunities
over a period for a unit equals
∫ t′
t
,u sds, and for an
organization it equals
∫ t′
t
-o sds.
Ad-hoc Assumption 4. The arrival rate of opportu-
nities to a unit in an organization is directly proportional
to the arrival rate for the organizational and inversely
proportional to the number of units.
ouu′ tOop∧uu o∧uu′ o
∧ u′& uu′ o = Uo
→ ,u t=-o t/Uo
We want to be able to compare cascades that take
place at different times for different organizations. Such
comparisons are simplest when the process that gen-
erates opportunities is stationary. If the arrival rate of
opportunities is constant over the period being consid-
ered, then we expect similar ﬂows for different organi-
zations over equal-length intervals located at different
points within the period. Given this motivation, we
add the ad-hoc assumption of stationarity in the arrival
process.
Ad-hoc Assumption 5. Opportunities arrive at the
same constant rate for all organizations in a population
with the same initial resource level.
oo′ t t′Oop∧Oo′ p∧ Ro t= Ro′ t′
→-o t=-o′ t′=-
It is helpful in expressing the assumption that reor-
ganization impedes the exploitation of opportunities to
use two predicates: reu t t′, which reads as “unit
u is reorganizing during the interval t t′”13 and
REo t t′, which reads as “none of the units in orga-
nization o is reorganizing during the interval t t′.” Let
qu t denote the random variable that equals one if unit
u misses an opportunity that arises at time t and equal
zero otherwise. The key substantive idea is that reorgani-
zation elevates the probability of missing opportunities.
Postulate 1. A unit’s probability of missing an
arriving opportunity is higher when it is in reorgani-
zation.
oo′uu′tt′Oop∧Oo′p∧uuo∧uu′o′
→Prqut=1  reut
>Prqu′t′=1 ¬reu′t′
Again we simplify the probability model. Because
we want to compare different organizations facing the
same opportunity structure and we have assumed that
this opportunity structure is common to all members of
a population, we assume that the probability of missing
opportunities (in reorganization or outside of reorganiza-
tion) does not vary among units in organizations in the
population or over time.
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Ad-hoc Assumption 6. The probabilities of missing
an opportunity conditional on reorganization and the
absence of reorganization vary over time but not among
units in the organizations in a population.
oo′uu′tt′∃1˜ 
1Oop∧Oo′p∧uuo∧uu′o′
→Prqut=1 ¬reut
=Prqu′t′=1 ¬reut′=2
∧Prqut=1  reut
=Prqu′t′=1  reut′=2+2˜
As an obvious consequence of P.1 and A.6, we have:
Lemma 4.
oOop→ 1˜ > 0
We want to focus on the expected difference in the
number of opportunities missed over an interval for
a reorganizing unit and an otherwise identical not-
reorganizing one. Let the random variable mu t t′
give the number of opportunities missed by unit u during
the interval t t′, and let the organization-level coun-
terpart be Mo t t′≡∑u&uu o mu t t′. We want to
characterize the expected value of mu t t′. We con-
sider only the simple case that pertains to a complete
duration of an induced violation.
Lemma 5.
ouu′ t1 t2 t3 t4
·
[
Oop∧uu o∧uu′ o
∧∀w[t1 ≤ w < t2→ reuw]
∧∀w′[t3 ≤ w′ < t4→¬reu′w′]
→ (Emu t1 t2= ,o2+ 2˜t2− t1)
∧ (Emu′ t3 t4= ,o2t4− t3)
]

Proof. The most-speciﬁc regularity chain uses A.4–
6. 
Suppose that we set t3 = t1 and t4 = t2 in L.5 (the
lemma does not claim that they are different). Then we
see that the expected excess of missed opportunities for
the reorganizer is ,o2˜t2− t1.
Next we want to extend the result to apply to a full
cascade of changes for an organization.
Theorem 3. The expected number of opportunities
missed due to reorganization for an organization during
a full cascade of reorganizations increases monotoni-
cally with the product of the organization’s viscosity, "o,
and intricacy, Io.
ou tOop∧uu o∧ o t= 1
→ EMo t t+T o t
=-2T o t+,02˜"oIo
Proof. The most-speciﬁc regularity chain uses L.4
and L.5. According to L.5, each unit contributes
,o2So t, the baseline that holds whether or not a unit
is in reorganization. This part of the process therefore
contributes ,o2So tUo = -2So t expected missed
opportunities. Next consider the additional expected
missed opportunities due to reorganization. The expected
total time spent reorganizing in a complete cascade
equals "oIo according to T.2. L.5 tells that the expected
additional missed opportunities because of reorganiza-
tion over all of the time spent reorganizing by units is
,o2˜"oIo. 
We can use this theorem to compare what happens to
two organizations that experience cascades of change.
A subtle issue needs attention. The two cascades might
differ in temporal scope, S. We want to compare expe-
riences over the time span of the longer cascade, so that
we get the full scope of both cascades. Things get very
complicated if we allow the possibility that the organi-
zation with the shorter cascade starts another cascade
within the period of comparison. So we want to restrict
the comparison to the case in which no subsequent initia-
tions of cascades occur within the period of comparison.
Notation. To avoid repeating a very complicated
expression in a series of lemmas and theorems, we intro-
duce some notational shorthand.
(1) Z =maxSo t So′ t′.
(2) The formula 9 stands for the following formula:
the entities being compared, o and o′, are organizations
in the same population with equal resources, experi-
ence architectural changes at times t and t′, respectively,
and neither experiences another (uninduced) architec-
tural change until the end of the longer of the two cas-
cades of change.
9 ↔ Oop∧Oo′ p∧ (o t= o′ t′= 1)
∧ Ro t= Ro′ t′
∧∀ s s′[t < s ≤ t+Z∧ t′ < s′ ≤ t′ +Z
→ o s= o′ s′= 0]
Application of T.3 for a pair of organizations under-
going cascades shows the role of intricacy and viscosity.
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Corollary 1. The difference in the expected number
of missed opportunities for two organizations undergo-
ing cascades of change is proportional to the difference
in the products of viscosity and intricacy.
oo′ t
t′
[
9 → EMo t t+Z−Mo′ t′ t′ +Z
= 1˜"oIo− "o′Io′
]

We focus on missed opportunities because failing to
capitalize on opportunities generally lowers the growth
in resources. We do not assume any knowledge of
the function that relates missed opportunities to the
growth in resources; instead, we argue for a weaker
monotonicity relationship. (This choice affects what
follows: Instead of getting precise results about expecta-
tions, we get monotonicity statements relating intricacy,
opacity, and asperity to resource growth and mortality
hazards.)
Postulate 2. Consider a pair of organizations in the
same population with equal stocks of resources at the
start of a time interval. If one misses more opportunities
over the interval than the other, then its expected growth
in resources is lower. Otherwise, the expected growth in
resources for the two is the same.14
oo′ t t′w
w′
[
Oop∧Oo′ p∧ Ro t= Ro′ t′
∧ Mo tw >Mo′ t′w′
→ ERow < ERow′]
Turning back to our example of the architectural
decentralization in General Motors, one might naturally
wonder how the company managed to survive, even
dominate, if these theoretical claims are accurate. After
all, the structural change and associated cascade intro-
duced in 1920 should have caused the ﬁrm to miss
opportunities. Sloan (1963, p. 50) suggests an answer:
Even mistakes played a large part in the actual events    and if
our competitors—Mr. Ford among them—had not made some
of their own of considerable magnitude, and if we had not
reversed certain of ours, the position of General Motors would
be different from what it is today.
It is reasonable to think the “mistakes” Sloan refers
to are the organization’s recognition of induced code
violations and subsequent adjustments. We interpret
his statement as recognizing that adjustments costs
were signiﬁcant and would have damaged the company
severely if its competitors had not been experiencing
similar difﬁculties. Given the massive expansion of the
automobile market at the time, it seems plausible that the
main competitors were all suffering from reorganization
pains.
Lemma 6. An organization’s expected growth rate
in resources during a cascade with a random origin
decreases with the organization’s total time reorganiz-
ing, Do t.
oo′ t t′
[
9 ∧ Do t > Do′ t′
→ ERo t+Z < ERo′ t′ +Z]
Proof. The most-speciﬁc regularity chain uses L.5
and P.2. 
Change and Organizational Mortality
Hannan and Freeman’s (1984) theory of structural inertia
implies that the hazard of mortality rises monotonically
with the duration of the period of reorganization. We
now show that this implication follows from the new the-
ory posited above. Modern work on organizational mor-
tality analyzes the hazard (Carroll and Hannan 2000).
Let :o t denote the mortality hazard for organization
o at time t. Nearly all treatments of the relationship of
size and resources with mortality assume that organiza-
tions with access to greater resources can better with-
stand life-threatening environmental shocks (Carroll and
Hannan 2000).
Postulate 3. If one of a pair of organizations in a
population has a higher level of resources than the other,
then it has a lower hazard of mortality.
oo′ t t′
[
Oop∧Oo′ p∧ Ro t > Ro′ t′
→ :o t < :o′ t′]
The most obvious implication of the overall argument
is that longer cascades pose higher mortality risks.
Theorem 4. The increase in the hazard of mortal-
ity due to an architectural change grows monotonically
with the time spent reorganizing within the cascade of
induced changes.
oo′tt′
[
9 ∧Dot>Do′t′
→
∫ t+Z
t
:osds>
∫ t′+Z
t′
:o′sds
]

Proof. The most-speciﬁc relevant regularity chain
uses L.6 and P.3. 
Hannan and Freeman’s (1984) key Assumption 9 can
now be derived as a theorem.
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Theorem 5. An organization’s hazard of mortality
presumably rises monotonically over a period of reor-
ganization.
o t s s′Oop∧ o t= 1
∧ t < s < s′ ≤ t+T o t
→ :o t+ s < :o t+ s′
Proof. In the most-speciﬁc regularity chain, L.6
holds that stocks of resources decline monotonically
with the duration of reorganization, and P.3 states
that the hazard of mortality falls monotonically with
resources. 
The main line of argument identiﬁes conditions that
increase the expected durations of cascades. If stocks of
resources fall monotonically during cascades, then the
factors that length cascades make change more risky.
We want to provide a formal statement of these implica-
tions for pairs of organizations that experience random
architectural changes and differ in the structural factors
that affect expected cascade length. The theorem sub-
sumes a version of Hannan and Freeman’s (1984, p. 162)
Theorem 5: “Complexity increases the risk of death due
to reorganization.”
Theorem 6. The increase in the hazard of mortality
due to an architectural change grows monotonically with
the product of intricacy, Io, and viscosity, "o.
oo′ t t′
[
9 ∧ "oIo > "o′Io′
→
∫ t+Z
t
:o sds >
∫ t′+Z
t′
:o′ sds
]

Proof. The most-speciﬁc regularity chain (given the
ad-hoc assumptions) begins with the intension of "oIo >
"o′Io′ . T.4 ties this condition to the expected length of a
reorganization period; T.5 completes the chain. 
Conclusion
We have embarked on a series of projects attempt-
ing to build new theoretical foundations for organiza-
tional ecology. We hope that these efforts will deepen
particular theoretical fragments and that the founda-
tions will allow a level of theoretical uniﬁcation not yet
achieved in organizational theory. Our primary goal in
this article was to elaborate the structural elements of
Hannan and Freeman’s (1984) theory of inertia. Struc-
tural imagery in the original theory consists mainly of
four types of features depicted as constituting the core
of the organization, including mission, form of authority,
technology, and marketing strategy. The theory assumes
that signiﬁcant or major organizational change involves
changing a core feature. It predicts that an organiza-
tion will encounter resistance if it attempts to change
core features; it also implies that changes in core fea-
tures likely have detrimental consequences. This concep-
tual approach to structure now strikes us as ad hoc and
underdeveloped. We also think that the list of core fea-
tures does not provide sufﬁcient guidance for empirical
research.
Our efforts here advanced an alternative way of iden-
tifying the signiﬁcance of organizational changes. We
assessed changes in light of connections in an organi-
zation’s architecture, deﬁned as a code system. In this
framework, a change is signiﬁcant if it (1) creates viola-
tions of architectural codes and (2) the effort to resolve
the violations triggers cascades of other changes. We fol-
lowed the original theory in concentrating on changes
directed at architecture and in positing that architectural
changes initiate cascades that more fully deﬁne periods
of reorganization. We deﬁned such reorganization peri-
ods precisely as the time its takes to resolve the code
violations induced by the initial change. We then tied
these considerations to organizational mortality using the
standard assumption that the hazard of mortality is pro-
portional to an organization’s stock of resources. We
assumed that reorganizing diminishes an organization’s
ability to mobilize resources. If so, then organizations
undergoing reorganization lose resources relative to oth-
erwise similar organizations that are not reorganizing.
Therefore, reorganization increases the hazard of mor-
tality. The key theoretical ﬁnding holds that the mortal-
ity risk of an organization increases with intricacy and
viscosity.
It makes sense at this point to ask what, if any, impli-
cations of the revised theory differ from the original.
One way to answer this question is to assess the likely
“coreness” of the four original core features in terms
of architectural signiﬁcance, as deﬁned here. If we have
made progress, then we would expect to ﬁnd that there
are some interesting differences but that many of the
original insights have been preserved. In the relevant
passage of the original, Hannan and Freeman (1984,
p. 156) argue as follows:
From the perspective of resource acquisition, the core aspects
of organization are (1) its stated goals—the bases on which
legitimacy and other resources are mobilized; (2) forms of
authority within the organization and the basis of exchange
between members and the organization; (3) core technology,
especially as encoded in capital investment, infrastructure, and
the skills of members; and (4) marketing strategy in a broad
sense—the kinds of clients (or customers) to which the organi-
zation orients its production and the ways it attracts resources
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from the environment. The four characteristics stand in a rough
hierarchy, with publicly stated goals subject to the strongest
constraints and marketing strategy the weakest   These four
properties provide a possible basis on which to classify orga-
nizations into forms for ecological analysis. An organiza-
tion’s initial conﬁguration on these four dimensions commits
it to a certain form of environmental dependence and a long-
term strategy.   Although organizations sometimes manage to
change positions on these dimensions, such changes are both
rare and seem to subject an organization to greatly increased
risks of death   We think that properties of organization charts
and patterns of speciﬁc exchanges with the actors in the envi-
ronment are more plastic than the core set   They can be
transformed because attempts at changing them involve rela-
tively little moral and political opposition within the organiza-
tion and do not raise fundamental questions about the nature
of the organization.
Several differences between this initial formulation
and that presented here deserve note. First, they employ
different bases for establishing coreness. The original
argument built explicitly on the notion that organiza-
tional forms and populations reﬂect discontinuities in
resource dependencies. The four core features were cho-
sen because of their presumed signiﬁcance for resource
acquisition. Our revised theory builds on the notion that
forms and populations are social identities that can be
expressed in terms of social and cultural codes (Pólos
et al. 2002). Having recognized this difference, it is
interesting to note that notions of identity did nonethe-
less play a part in shaping the original argument. (This
facet of the argument has largely been forgotten in con-
temporary renderings.) Note the emphasis on the “fun-
damental questions about the nature of the organization.”
In particular, Hannan and Freeman (1984, pp.
155–156) motivated the argument about the hierarchy of
inertial forces with the example of the university. They
pointed out that some features, such as the textbooks
used for instruction, change constantly in an adaptive
way. However, they argued that changing a curriculum
from one based on liberal arts for one premised on voca-
tional training would be extraordinarily difﬁcult. After
noting some of the difﬁculties, they summarized the case
as follows (Hannan and Freeman 1984, p. 156):
The curriculum is difﬁcult to change, then, because it repre-
sents the core of the university’s organizational identity and
underlies the distribution of resources across the organization.
In these ways, it can be said to lie at the university’s “core.”
In retrospect, this view seems more useful for building
theory and guiding research than reliance on the quar-
tet of features that have ﬁgured more prominently in
received empirical research built on the initial theory.
A second difference concerns the role of architecture.
The original argument treated architecture as “plastic”
and relatively insigniﬁcant for understanding inertia and
change. Our revised theory allows for the possibility that
architectural change might be highly signiﬁcant. In pro-
viding a list of features constituting the core, the origi-
nal theory did not allow any exceptions, and it did not
provide any guidance for dealing with them if they are
encountered. In these respects, we believe that the new
theory improves the analysis.
The new theory also provides different, speciﬁc advice
for conducting empirical research on structural inertia.
Rather than look at a single type of change in a popula-
tion of organizations (such that each experiences change
as a single time-varying independent variable), the the-
ory implies that the subsequent cascading changes and
their temporal dimensions should be studied as well.
In current empirical studies, a commonly observed pat-
tern suggests that mortality hazards jump when changes
get undertaken, but that they then decline with the time
elapsed from the change. On the basis of the new theory,
it now seems important to know if the studied structural
change is the initiating change in a cascade or simply
one episode in a longer sequence. But how much does
this matter?
The typical contemporary study traces the mortality
consequences through a complete organizational pop-
ulation for a single type of structural change, say a
basic product design change among bicycle manufac-
turers (see Carroll and Hannan 2000 for a review).
Although this design represents a deﬁnite advancement
over previous studies with outcome-biased samples, it
does not observe the cascades of changes brought on by
the initial adjustment. As a result, none of the follow-
ing are visible: The total time reorganizing, the temporal
span of the cascade, or the end of the period of reorga-
nization. This means that commonly estimated duration
effects about the shape of the hazard following a change,
based simply on time elapsed since the initial change,
may be biased. To see the impact of this, assume for
the moment (for ease of interpretation) that the studied
change is the initiating event and that there is a positive
relation between total time reorganizing and the tempo-
ral span of a cascade. Under these assumptions, The-
orem 5 implies that the hazard of mortality rises with
the duration of the reorganization. But, empirical stud-
ies, which have not sought to disentangle reorganization
effects from processes that operate after reorganization
generally ﬁnd that the hazard falls monotonically fol-
lowing the initial jump at the time of the change. We
suggest that this common pattern might arise solely from
the design of these studies. A design that records subse-
quent changes and better measures the temporal aspects
of reorganizing might very well yield different ﬁndings.
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Appendix. Theoretical Methodology
The Formal Language
In formalizing our argument we use a language that combines elements
of some formal languages routinely used in mathematics and a formal
language presented in Pólos and Hannan (2003) to represent the non-
monotonic argumentation in theory building. Some basic mathematical
disciplines such as linear algebra, calculus, and probability theory func-
tion as meta-theory for this paper. Concepts, language, and insights from
these disciplines are used freely.
The logical component of our formal language can be best character-
ized by the fact that there are four different quantiﬁers in the language: We
have the classical universal quantiﬁer ∀ and three nonclassical quantiﬁers:
, , and . These new quantiﬁers are used to express causal stories,
rules with possible exceptions, (), presumptions or derived implications
(), and ad-hoc assumptions (). The ad-hoc assumptions are not part of
the substantive theory; they are assumptions that allow certain conclusions
to be derived from the main postulates. Like the causal stories, the ad-hoc
assumptions, also allow for possible exceptions.
As a theory is being built, it is in ﬂux. This means that the theory
is partial in several ways. First, the theory is not categorical, i.e., there
are classical sentences of the language of the theory that are neither true
nor false according to the still-developing theory. Theory building in this
respect involves efforts to eliminate the “unknown” truth-values and to
replace them with either “true” or “false.” Second, the rules or causal
stories are generic sentences, rules with exceptions, rather than universally
quantiﬁed sentences. Third, a theory in ﬂux might not contain all of the
relevant rules, and some stages of a theory in ﬂux might contain more
rules than others. In this last case, theory building yields extensions of the
rule set.
Because of these forms of partiality, the logic of the argumentation
has a nonmonotonic character. In logic, monotonicity means that adding
premises to an argument cannot overthrow implications that hold for the
simpler premise set. If an argument is nonmonotonic, then adding (more
speciﬁc) premises can eliminate implications of the prior set of premises.
Theory building tends to follow nonmonotonic patterns in that better
informed stages of the same theory in ﬂux might not support implications
that were justiﬁed in less well informed stages of the same theory.
We mark the sentences that are responsible for this nonmonotonic
behavior with the nonclassical quantiﬁers. Explanatory principles are the
key substantive ingredients of theory, the speciﬁc causal explanations. So
we call them causal stories. Causal stories differ from classical ﬁrst-order
(universal) principles in two ways. First, causal stories are more stable
than classical principles, which get overturned by a single counterexam-
ple. Speciﬁcally, causal stories should be treated as informationally stable:
They ought not be withdrawn even when their ﬁrst-order consequences
get falsiﬁed. Instead, the effects of the causal stories are controlled by
more speciﬁc arguments. Second, the grammatical surface of a causal
story typically takes the form of what linguists call bare plural sentences.
The normal interpretation of such linguistic forms is as generic sentences
(Carlson and Pelletier 1995), which express general—but not universal—
ideas. The truth conditions of a generic sentence cannot be expressed in
terms of particular cases. In other words, causal stories are default rules
that tell what ought to be expected under normal conditions.
As a theory develops, the only thing that can happen to a causal story
is that new insights might restrict its domain of application, in the case
that knowledge about exceptions develops. Even new knowledge should
not lead us to discard a causal story. Instead, we add new rules to the
body of knowledge; and we allow the new, more speciﬁc rules to override
older, more general rules. Suppose that new knowledge casts serious doubt
on a causal story. Then discarding it might be exactly the right thing to
do. Yet, doing so means that the theory is changed so fundamentally that
we should regard the old theory as having been ended and a new theory
begun.
Sentences preﬁxed with the quantiﬁer , state what is expected to be
the case “normally” according to a causal story. Such sentences yield non-
monotonicity by their inferential behavior. Although rules with exceptions
breed nonmonotonicity, once a rule becomes part of a theory in ﬂux it
remains part of the theory in any future stages. The implications of these
rules might come and go as the theory develops, but the causal stories are
not erased.
To mark the sentences that can be erased occasionally by theory devel-
opment (the implications of rules with exceptions) we use the quantiﬁer
. Because causal stories are default rules, implications are drawn from
them on the basis of the best available evidence. In other words, they are
defeasible. Different stages of the theory in ﬂux select different sets of
evidence as the best available evidence. However, the defeasible conse-
quences (the presumptions) do not become part of the theory. That status
is preserved for the persistent sentences.
Some theory builders assume that the use of mathematical models is the
core of formalization. Although we use parts of mathematics (as indicated
above), we intend to formalize the argumentation in theory building too.
As we argued above, the logic that is suitable for this task is a nonmono-
tonic logic (see the next section of the Appendix). However, the logic of
mathematical reasoning is typically classical ﬁrst-order logic. To combine
these two types of formalism, we need an interface. The interface will be
a nonsubstantive ad-hoc assumption. We use the  quantiﬁer to mark the
ad-hoc assumptions.
Probabilistic arguments often yield expected value differences for some
random variables while the causal stories connect the differences of factual
values of the same variables to certain outcomes. Suppose that a theory
stage implies that the expected value of a random variable for one entity
is larger than for another: EY a > EY b. In this case we argue that
the same theory stage should be held to presume that a normal outcome
is that Y a > Y b. This consideration yields the following assumption
schema:
abEY a > EY b→ Y a > Y b
We call this formula an assumption schema because one can substitute
any random variable for Y and any number of variable (equally long)
sequences for a and b and the resulting formula will be an acceptable
ad-hoc assumption. It is easy to see that these formulae are not causal
stories; they are premises that we ﬁnd rational to use.
Ad-hoc assumptions sit halfway between substantive assumptions
(causal stories) and implications (presumptions). They are assumptions,
but their truth conditions are the same as similar presumptions. Once the
Organization Science/Vol. 14, No. 5, September–October 2003 479
MICHAEL T. HANNAN, LÁSZLÓ PÓLOS, AND GLENN R. CARROLL Cascading Organizational Change
machinery of ad-hoc quantiﬁcation is introduced, it turns out to be useful
to model thought experiments, to study questions such as: What would be
provable had    been the case?
It is important to note that all three nonclassical quantiﬁers are intro-
duced to deal with the fact that causal stories yield default rules. As long
as exceptions are not dealt with, all three of them can be interpreted as
universal quantiﬁers. Because the present paper is part of an exercise to
rebuild the foundation of organizational ecology, we must be prepared for
exceptions even if the exceptions do not show up here. We intend to build
a module of a larger model, so compatibility has to be secured with the
later additions. Use of the nonmonotonic logic gives the best chances for
establishing such compatability.
About the Formal Logic
Causal stories refer to regularities in the world. We consider them to be
true if the regularity is indeed present and to be false if the regularity
they express is absent from the actual world. This makes their falsiﬁ-
cation and veriﬁcation equally difﬁcult, though not impossible. We use
a model-theoretic approach to logic. We build models for the premises
and use these models to identify the implications of the premises. If we
know exactly which sentences are true, then we know how the world
looks through the looking glass of the language. Premises that provide
only partial information, therefore, cannot describe the world completely.
Instead of telling how the world looks, they provide a description of sev-
eral alternative pictures, one of which is the picture of the real world.
In logic these alternative pictures are called possible worlds. To build a
model for classical logic it is sufﬁcient to refer to one possible world,
the actual one. Intensional logics were introduced to study arguments that
deal with several alternative possibilities.15 Models for intensional logics
are constructed from a set of possible worlds. The intension of a sentence
is a function that tells its truth value in all possible worlds; we denote the
intension of the sentence < as <.
A theory stage has two components, a set of possible worlds and a
set of regularities. The ﬁrst component captures the factual information:
Only those possible worlds are in the set that satisfy the factual premises.
The set of regularities16 represents the established causal stories. Theory
augmentations with ad-hoc assumptions are represented by theory stages
made as similar to the not-augmented theory stage as possible while mak-
ing the ad-hoc assumptions true.
Arguments are modeled by regularity chains. The linking condition for
building a chain is that the antecedent of the second premise should be
more general/less speciﬁc than the consequent of the ﬁrst premise. To ﬁnd
out whether a theory stage implies a formula of the form
<→ =
one should take the most-speciﬁc regularity chains that connect < to
= and demonstrate that at least one of them is more speciﬁc than any
regularity chain that connects < to ¬=. In this paper we can restrict
ourselves to the ﬁrst half of the task because the arguments do not supply
any regularity chains that connect < to ¬= in case of the theorems
and lemmas we prove.
Endnotes
1Barnett and Carroll (1995) and Carroll and Hannan (2000) review
the relevant research.
2The micro-units in ecological theory are organizations, not persons,
and the macro-units are populations of organizations. Of course, one
might strive for a theory that begins with persons and derives impli-
cations for organizations and populations. In our view, the current
state of empirical and theoretical knowledge does not support such an
ambitious approach. See Hannan (1992) for an extended discussion
of these strategic issues.
3In terms of the formalisms of the theory-building strategy, this would
work as follows. Suppose that Ap is a postulate of the theory. Then
the theoretical claim formulated in a way that allows for accidental
exceptions would be stated as pAp. We do not introduce this
level of complication in our formal rendering of the theory.
4In Simon’s model, the core of the employment relationship is the
notion that the employee will allow the employer to choose tasks from
some restricted range of options.
5In formal terms, ∀oo′ uuu o∧uu o′→ o = o′.
6Bonacich’s measure (in the original notation) is
c	?= 	
∑
k=0
?kRk+1l
This version is tuned to allowing the importance of direct and indirect
connections to vary in importance. In our context, we do not need to
make this distinction. Thus, we have simpliﬁed Bonacich’s measure
by setting 	= ?= o .
7We use the abbreviation A.x to refer to ad-hoc assumption x; sim-
ilarly we use D.x for deﬁnitions, P.x for postulates, L.x for lemmas,
and T.x for theorems.
8In the ﬁrst case, some of the work of the ﬁrst reorganization might
need to be undone in the second, which would tend to lengthen the
process. However, the second case involves a more highly constrained
reorganization (because it deals with constraints coming from differ-
ent sources). So there does not seem to be a strong argument that
either would generally take longer.
9The Oxford English Dictionary deﬁnes intricate as “perplexingly
entangled or involved; interwinding in a complicated manner.”
10We make the standard assumption that two or more events cannot
occur at the same instant.
11All of the lemmas and theorems would hold (in modiﬁed form due
to the greater complexity of implementing this assumption) if we
substituted this alternative ad-hoc assumption. Nonetheless, we want
to make the ad-hoc assumptions as innocuous as possible. We want
to show that the argument is sound even when we make the weaker
assumption that every unit is equally likely to initiate a change.
12For the discrete case, the law of total probability states that
PrX ≤ x=∑
y
PrX ≤ x  Y = y ·PrY = y
13In formal terms,
REu t t′ ↔ ∃u′wvuu′w= 1∧ w ≤ t
∧ w+Do t  u t= 1 > t′
14The equality condition follows from the background assumption that
the trichotomy relation holds, that if it is not the case that a > b or
a < b, then a= b.
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15Gamut (1991) provides an accessible overview of developments in
intensional logic.
16We model regularities by pairs of formula intensions: The ﬁrst ele-
ment in the pair is the antecedent in an implication and the second is
the consequent.
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